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We will have to determine the extent of the
individual participation of each defendant, based upon
his individual action, in all of the activities related to
the planning, preparation and waging of aggressive
wars and, in that connection, consideration will be
given to acts done in their personal, individual, or
official capacity not performed in their capacity as
officials or employees of the Farben enterprises. In
addition it will be necessary to consider the extent of
the participation of the alleged instrumentality Farben,
in the such activities and then to asses the degree of
individual responsibility, if any, for the actions of
Farben, the instrumentality, and the subsidiaries of
Farben. Some of the defendants acted personally and
completely outside the frame-work of Farben, while
others acted solely in their capacities as officials and
employees. Basically this involves these questions What is the responsibility of a member of the
Vorstand of Farben who knew that a gigantic
rearmament program was being carried out by the
business enterprise of which he was a responsible
director – who knew that such rearmament program
was being directed by (a national policy) the State
which was then actively engaged in an aggressive
foreign policy of territorial aggandizement based
primarily upon a threat of emplying force if necessary
for the achievement of the objectives of that foreign
policy. Upon to a certain

period of time, even (wi) if the defendants are to be
charged with the common knowledge then prevailing in
Germany, it cannot be said that upo to that point of time
there was ever any common knowledge of the intention
of Hitler and the Nazi party to wage a war of
aggression. Certainly the Munich pact was widely
heralded as the end of territorial demands of Hitler and
created widespread hope as Chamberlain had
optimistically expressed it that the policy of
appeasement would result in the purchase of peace in
our time. It cannot be denied that there was
considerable fear in Germany that they policies of
Hitler would lead to war. That he would become so
saturated with the successes without necessity of
launching a war that he would intensify his excessive
demands and would overstep the limits of toleration of
such policy which up to then had been suffered, albeit
not without protest, by the community of nations,
dedicated as they were to the high humanitarian
purpose of averting the catastrophy of a second world
war. The extent to which the civilized nations of the
world were willing to go in this regard is well
illustrated by the appeals made to Hitler by the
President of the United States and the Vatican on the
eve of the invasion of Poland and in a last minute effort
to prevail upon Hitler to agree to

mediation of his demands, thereby avoiding the horrors
which have now been written with blood in the pages of
history.
Can it be said that these defendants had knowledge
of Hitler's plans to wage an aggressive war in the
absence of direct and positive proof of such knowledge
brought home to either through participation on one of
the important secret conferences at which he announced
his aggressive intentions or through other credible proof
that report decisions was brought home to them in some
other way by persons havving direct and intimate
knowledge of such plans and intentions. It has been
argued this this question may be answered in the
affirmativ(e) and that a case for the requisite criminal
knowledge to establish on of the essential elements of
criminal guilt is to be found in a series of interences
which may be legitimately drawn and applied to the
activities of the defendants in this case. This amounts to
poling inference upon inference and while such
deductions from the chain of facts does constitute
conclusions that are decidedly more in the realm of
probability than in the realm of possibility; while the
Tribunal is invlined to believe that the defendants, or
some of them, may have known of the plans to agrresive
war – yet notwithstanding this inclination on the part of
the Tribunal, we cannot conclude from the evidence
before us that the fact of knowledge is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt in accordance with the standard of
porrof above mentioned.

It is true that the defendants occupied high positions in
the industrial life of Germany and in that capacity they
had much intimate knowledge which was withheld
from the General public. They knew, for example, theat
their plans were engaged day by day in production of
many materials, chemical products which could be used
only for the waging of war. They knew that furthermore
than they were engaged in the production of synthetic
raw materials without which Germany could not wage
war on a scale which could not possibly been keeping
with not alone the peace time needs of Germany. They
knew or were charged with knowledge that facility
expansion for the production of these materials was far
in excess of any possible peace-time estimates of the
needs of Germany. They knew that secret stand-by
plants for war production were being erected by them
under agreements with the Reich and various agencies
of the Wermacht. But all that this amounts to is an
intimate knowledge of the extent of the secret rearmament of Germany unless we are prepared to say (as
a matter of law) that rearmament with knowledge that
such gigantic efforts are involved creates the necessary
inference that they knew of the plans to wage
aggressive wars, the case against the defendants must
fall on the charge of planning and preparing a war of
aggression.

While factual distinctions may be drawn between the
activities of Schacht who was acquitted by the
International Military Tribunal and the sustained
activities of the Farben defendants – the pronouncement
by the Tribunal that "rearmament does not constitute a
crime under the Charter" cannot be overlooked or easily
explained away. It is perhaps a deplorable state of
affairs to be forced to recognize that gigantic
rearmament activities carried out by a group of men
who were willing to do business with Hitler and who, at
every stage of the hideous Nazi program, raised no
voice of protest, but went along willingly in that
program does not constitute a crime against peace. But
the answer to that problem is one which has often been
given before applying principles of law which this
tribunal is bound to uphold. There can be no
pubishment for action unless the action denounced
constitutes a crime. Here one of the essential elements
of the crime of planning and preparing for a war of
aggression is lacking, that is the guilty knowledge. The
principles of international law reflected in the Charter
of the International Military Tribunal have indeed by
legislative enactment any recognition of principles of
common international law after the development of
Anglo American common law – progressed to the point
at which the planning or preparation of a war of
aggression is a crime against international law for
which there is

individual penal responsibility, but it cannot be now
asserted that international law has developed to the point
at which rearmament of itself was recognized as a crime
against intentional law unless that rearmament
is part and parcel of a plan to wage aggressive war known
to the parties participating in the rearmament. It is
fervently to be hoped that in the not two distant future the
dangerous potentialities of action of the character of which
these defendants were engaged will be recognized to the
point of >developing some ? arming the community of
nations to deal with its problem of > rearmament in
violation of international treates a crime of itself without
the necessity > (of proving) Perhaps action of this
character should be made punishable without exact > a
knowledge of the intended use of armaments so produced.
But here there is (an inescapable conflict with the
possibility of lawing action) despite the difficulty of
harmonizing any such rule of law with rearmament
legitimately conceived for defensive purposes. (which are
the legitimate in character.)
We might draw an analogy. Suppose that Mr.
Truman should be advised that war with the Soviet Union
is inevitable and he and a high circle of advisers determine
that they will pursue a policy based upon the threat of
force even to the application to force to obtain certain
demands from Russia.
The intention to use force to the point of war is not
publicly announced, but the demands of the Government
of the United States are made public

an immediately there is widespread fear that the policy
so announced means that the war with Russia is
inevitable. There is immediate intensification of the
rearmament plans of the United States. Measnres for
economic mobilization for ware are initiated; projuction
of armament is pushed with all the initiative and
inhenuity which is characteristic of American free
enterprise; Americans gird themselves and get ready for
come what may. The last demand of the United States
is rejected and the President and Congress of the United
States declare war on Russia under circumstances
which make it inescapable that the war is a war of
aggression. Can it be said that the officials of the
Dupont company are liable for participating in the
planning and preparation of a war of aggression if the
knew nothing more than the common knowledge above
referred to? Can it be said that the Oak Ridge scientist
who, with knowledge of the possibility that war was
imminent, feverishly and with great initiative, rushes to
completion the current modification of his atomic bom,
even more terrible than the first, is guilty of initiating a
war of aggression, or participating in the planning and
prepratiaon for such a war? In judging facts in
retrospect we mush soundly consider the application of
such facts to other times and other circumstances which
cannot be readily distinguishable on principle.

Unless rearmament with knowledge of the possibility
that an aggressive war is imminent, constitutes a crime,
the defendants can not be convicted for participation in
the cmmon plan of aggression or initiating, planning,
and preparing a war of aggression, in violation of
treaties etc.
It is no doubt considerations such as these which
prompted the IMT to require, as a condition precedent
to criminal complicity in the common plan that there be
some detailed and intimate knowledge of specific plans
to wage a was of aggression. The prosecution correctly
states that it is not essential that the date and the hour be
known - but the fact that a war of aggression is to be
launched must be knwon to constitute the requisite
guilty knowledge.

